Description
This detector identifies the presence of specialized tooling and environmental configurations commonly associated with active cyberattack operations or deliberate attempts to bypass security controls. Rather than flagging a device simply for being unfamiliar, this detector focuses on identifying devices that are operationally equipped for attack activity.
A suspected attack device exhibits technical indicators that suggest the environment is prepared for manipulation, evasion, or exploitation.
Common indicators include:
Active debugger or developer tools
Detection of an active browser debugger, developer console, or remote debugging session. These tools allow an operator to manipulate page elements, intercept or modify network requests, and bypass client-side validation logic in real time.
Attacker-centric browser extensions
Presence of browser extensions commonly used for security research, session hijacking, cookie manipulation, or anti-fingerprinting. Examples include tools for editing cookies, spoofing headers, or dynamically toggling proxy configurations.
Multi-account or identity management environments
Detection of specialized browsers designed to manage large numbers of isolated browser profiles or identities from a single device. These environments are frequently used to conduct repeated or parallel social engineering attempts while avoiding cross-session contamination.
Automation and scripting artifacts
Identification of global variables, runtime properties, or execution traces left behind by automation frameworks such as Selenium, Puppeteer, or Playwright, indicating that browser actions may be controlled programmatically rather than by a human operator.
Relevance to Social Engineering Attacks
Social engineering operations often involve active preparation and real-time manipulation of the attack environment. Devices used in these campaigns are frequently equipped with tooling that supports deception, persistence, and rapid adaptation during interactions with victims or help desk personnel.
Common attacker behaviors include:
Real-time technical manipulation
During support calls or verification processes, attackers may use debugging tools to alter page behavior, hide interface elements, or modify visible data to make their narrative appear more credible to a technician observing a shared screen.
Identity hopping across multiple targets
When targeting multiple employees within the same organization, attackers rely on multi-account browsers to keep each session isolated. Detection of this behavior distinguishes professional attack infrastructure from standard employee workstations.
Bypassing visual and session-based security controls
Specialized extensions are used to manipulate cookies, headers, or client-side state in order to remain authenticated after password changes or to suppress security indicators. The presence of such tooling is a strong indicator of malicious intent.
Pre-attack reconnaissance and testing
Prior to engaging in direct social engineering, attackers often probe applications to understand validation logic, error handling, or security responses. Identifying a suspected attack device at this stage enables early disruption before the attack escalates into human interaction.
Examples of Detected Tooling and Platforms
This detector is effective against environments equipped with tools such as:
Development and exploitation frameworks
Chrome DevTools (when used for manipulation), Burp Suite, OWASP ZAP.
Specialized browser extensions
EditThisCookie, Cookie-Editor, User-Agent Switcher and Manager, and various proxy-switching extensions.
Anti-detect and multi-profile platforms
AdsPower, Multilogin, Dolphin{anty}, GoLogin.
Notable Incidents and Threat Actors
Scattered Spider (UNC3944)
Known for leveraging legitimate-looking remote access and debugging tools during social engineering engagements to manipulate help desk workflows and induce MFA resets.
Lapsus$
Notorious for using browser extensions and session manipulation techniques to inject stolen cookies and bypass MFA without requiring the victim’s password.